MetaDAO Sale
This page is provided for informational purposes to explain protocol mechanics. It does not constitute an offer of securities or investment advice. $P2P is not available to US persons. Nothing herein should be construed as a promise of financial return. Please read the full Disclosures before proceeding.
The $P2P token launches on Solana through a MetaDAO-style sale mechanism designed for fair, community-first distribution.
- Users commit USDC on Solana during a 4-day commitment window
- Founders set the total USDC accepted (F) using commitment-weighted tiers (see below)
- If oversubscribed, allocations and refunds are distributed pro-rata
- 10M tokens are distributed proportionally among all participants at launch
- Post-sale, the treasury provides 20% of raised USDC and 2.9M tokens to liquidity pools
- Mint authority transfers to the market-governed treasury
Note — no bid wall. The sale does not use a bid-wall or minimum-bid ladder. Clearing is pro-rata against the accepted cap; any USDC that is not allocated is refunded.
Raise size, FDV steps, and refunds
The public ask is $6M USDC. If total commitments exceed $6M, only the accepted amount is filled; excess commitments are refunded according to the pro-rata and XP-preference steps below.
How much can be accepted scales with total commitments (C):
| If total commitments C… | USDC accepted | Implied FDV |
|---|---|---|
| C ≤ $80M | Up to $6M | $15.48M |
| $80M < C ≤ $150M | Up to $8M | $20.64M |
| C > $150M | Up to $10M | $25.8M |
Only when C is greater than $80M does the sale accept up to $8M at $20.64M FDV. Only when C is greater than $150M does it accept up to $10M at $25.8M FDV. In all cases, unaccepted USDC is returned to participants.
Existing protocol users receive a preferential allocation at the same valuation as all public sale participants, based on their XP on p2p.foundation. Before participating, please review the Disclosures.
Preferential allocation formula
The following defines how commitments are converted into final allocations when the sale is oversubscribed and XP tiers apply multipliers. Non-XP participants still receive a pro-rata share; XP holders receive a boosted slice of the accepted raise, capped at what they committed.
Variables
| Symbol | Definition |
|---|---|
| C | Total USDC committed by all participants |
| F | Funding cap accepted by founders (F ≤ C) |
| c_i | USDC committed by participant i |
| T1, T2, T3 | Sets of participants in XP tiers 1 (highest), 2, and 3 |
| N | Set of non-XP participants |
| m_1 = 3 | Tier 1 multiplier |
| m_2 = 2 | Tier 2 multiplier |
| m_3 = 1.5 | Tier 3 multiplier |
Steps
Step 1 — Base pro-rata rate. Compute the acceptance rate as if no preferences existed.
r = F / C
Step 2 — Base allocation per participant. Every participant receives a base slice proportional to their commitment.
base_i = c_i * r
Step 3 — Apply XP multiplier. For each XP holder in tier t, multiply their base allocation by that tier's multiplier. Allocation cannot exceed what they committed.
pref_i = min(base_i * m_t, c_i)
Non-XP participants are unchanged at this step.
Step 4 — Total preferred allocation. Sum all XP-preferred allocations.
A_pref = sum(pref_i) for all i in T1 + T2 + T3
Step 5 — Remaining pool for non-XP holders. Subtract XP allocations from the funding cap.
A_remaining = F - A_pref
Step 6 — Non-XP reallocation. Non-XP holders split the remaining pool pro-rata by commitment.
C_N = sum(c_j) for all j in N
final_j = c_j * (A_remaining / C_N)
Step 7 — Refunds. Each participant receives the difference between commitment and final allocation.
refund_i = c_i - final_allocation_i
Worked example
Setup. XP holders are a small fraction of the pool. Ten non-XP participants each commit $10,000. Three XP holders commit smaller amounts.
| Participant | Commitment | XP tier | Multiplier |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alice | $500 | Tier 1 | 3× |
| Bob | $300 | Tier 2 | 2× |
| Carol | $200 | Tier 3 | 1.5× |
| D1 through D10 | $10,000 each | None | 1× |
- C = $101,000 (total committed)
- F = $10,000 (founders accept $10,000; the remainder is refunded)
Step 1 — Base rate.
r = 10,000 / 101,000 = 0.099010 (9.9%)
Step 2 — Base allocation. Note: intermediate values use full precision; displayed values are rounded.
| Participant | Commitment | base_i |
|---|---|---|
| Alice | $500 | $49.50 |
| Bob | $300 | $29.70 |
| Carol | $200 | $19.80 |
| Each D | $10,000 | $990.10 |
Without preferences, Alice would receive $49.50 allocated and $450.50 refunded.
Step 3 — Apply multipliers. Multipliers are applied to full-precision base values, then rounded.
| Participant | base_i | Multiplier | pref_i |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alice | $49.50 | 3× | min($148.51, $500) = $148.51 |
| Bob | $29.70 | 2× | min($59.41, $300) = $59.41 |
| Carol | $19.80 | 1.5× | min($29.70, $200) = $29.70 |
Step 4 — Total preferred.
A_pref = 148.51 + 59.41 + 29.70 = $237.62
Step 5 — Remaining pool.
A_remaining = 10,000 - 237.62 = $9,762.38
Step 6 — Non-XP reallocation.
C_N = 10 * 10,000 = $100,000
Each D: 10,000 * (9,762.38 / 100,000) = $976.24
Result. Totals may differ by small amounts due to rounding.
| Participant | Final allocation | Refund |
|---|---|---|
| Alice (T1) | $148.51 | $351.49 |
| Bob (T2) | $59.41 | $240.59 |
| Carol (T3) | $29.70 | $170.30 |
| Each D (×10) | $976.24 | $9,023.76 |
| Total | ~$10,000 | ~$91,000 |
Versus no preferences.
| Participant | Without preference | With preference | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alice | $49.50 | $148.51 | +$99.01 (3×) |
| Bob | $29.70 | $59.41 | +$29.71 (2×) |
| Carol | $19.80 | $29.70 | +$9.90 (1.5×) |
| Each D | $990.10 | $976.24 | −$13.86 |
XP holders receive approximately $138.62 more in aggregate than they would without preferences. That amount is spread across ten non-XP participants, so each D is lower by approximately $13.86 (about 1.4% of their base allocation). The effect on non-XP holders stays small when XP commitments are a small share of C.